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Abstract 
It is nearly ten years that the EU’s antitrust enforcement has been decentralised by Regulation 1/2003. 
This paper is a small contribution taking stock of how this process has fared. After setting out a 
position on the discussion of two oft used benchmarks for assessing competition agencies 
(independence and legitimacy), we turn to evaluate the Commission and national competition 
authorities. While the Commission is now a well established enforcer, a number of channels serve to 
oversee national competition authorities: measures adopted in response to the economic crisis allow 
the Commission to recommend modifications to competition law statutes; the case law of the ECJ, in 
particular by reference to the principle of effectiveness, reduces the scope for national policy choices; 
and the European Competition Network appears focused on securing convergent outcomes and 
procedures. Perhaps the ultimate paradox of these centralising tendencies is how local national 
antitrust enforcement has remained. 
Keywords 
Regulation 1/2003, European Competition Network; National Competition Authorities, independence, 
legitimacy, interdependence 
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INDEPENDENCE, INTERDEPENDENCE AND LEGITIMACY: THE EU COMMISSION, NATIONAL 
COMPETITION AUTHORITIES, AND THE EUROPEAN COMPETITION NETWORK 
Giorgio Monti* 
Introduction 
For many years, enforcement of competition law in the European Union had been largely a matter for 
the European Commission, with Member States’ enforcement of national competition law lagging 
somewhat behind. Since the mid-1980s, a number of factors led to an increased level of competition 
law enforcement by the Commission,1 and then to a galvanisation of national laws and national 
competition authorities.2 At present each national competition authority (hereinafter NCA) is obliged 
to apply EU competition law in situations where what is suspected is an infringement of Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU (viz. restrictive practices and abuses of a dominant position),3 which means that there 
are at least twenty-eight NCAs plus the European Commission.4  Presently, the design of the NCAs is 
again in a state of flux in a number of Member States, as a result of the economic crisis: governments 
see cost-savings in merging competition authorities with other regulatory bodies (e.g. consumer bodies 
and utilities regulators). 
The purpose of this essay is to examine this large number of enforcement bodies within the framework 
of three concepts. The first two may be treated as a pair: independence and legitimacy. These are well-
known criteria by which the enforcement of law by administrative agencies is assessed; the third 
notion, interdependence, is a phenomenon of increasing salience in the context of global governance, 
and here it refers to the relationship among the various competition authorities in the EU.5 
The essay is structured in the following way. First, we discuss the notions of independence and 
legitimacy in general terms and elicit how these may be applied to the work of competition authorities.  
Second, we consider how well the Commission and NCAs score by reference to these benchmarks.  In 
the third part of the paper we introduce a discussion of interdependence and how far this affects our 
study of each competition authority’s independence and legitimacy.  In large part this paper is a survey 
of the issues, however some general arguments are developed, in particular the essay makes the 
following key points. First, independence is contingent on a political choice about how markets should 
work, and it is that choice which matters most; concomitantly because independence is a political 
choice, the competition authority has to play a careful enforcement strategy when applying the rules in 
sensitive sectors.  Second, there is an increasing trend to measure the output legitimacy of competition 
authorities, even if the methodologies for doing this are disputed; but what appears to be most relevant 
(at least to agencies) is their reputation for good work. Third, the role of National Competition 
                                                     
* Professor of Competition Law, European University Institute. This essay is based on lectures given at the Twenty-third 
Session of the Academiy of Europan Law in July 2012. 
1 L. McGowan, ‘Safeguarding the Economic Constitution: the Commission and Competition Policy’ in N. Nugent, At the 
Heart of The Union – Studies of the European Commission (Basingstoke, Macmillan Press, 2nd ed, 2000) 151-3. 
2 Enlargement of the EU led accession states to introduce laws that mimicked the EU norms, more established Member States 
reformed their competition rules as a result of a general policy of economic liberalisation (e.g. Italy and France) and 
others considered it convenient to align national laws to European ones in the name of legal certainty (e.g. the UK). See, 
generally, D.J. Gerber Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe (Oxford University Press, 1998) ch.10. 
3 Article 3, Regulation 1/2003, [2004] OJ L1/1 
4 In some Member States there is even more than one authority, for example the UK where national regulators in certain 
economic sectors have powers to enforce competition law that are concurrent to those of the NCA. 
5 On this phenomenon generally, see A-M Slaughter A New World Order (Princeton University Press, 2004). 
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Authorities in the new enforcement network is characterised by significant control by the European 
institutions: the ECJ and the Commission have found ways of requesting modifications to the design 
and work of NCAs in the name of effective enforcement. Fourth, the main reasons for creating the 
European Competition Network (allocating cases and sharing information) have not been the principal 
ways in which interdependence has evolved. Instead, the ECN serves as a policy network where two 
types of discussion occur: first how to ensure convergent policy among the NCAs; second how to best 
address certain recurring legal/economic issues. The ECN bolsters the independence of NCAs (for 
Member States will find it harder to resist a policy initiative that is supported by the network), but at 
the same time it is a further centralising force in its search for convergence in enforcement; 
furthermore the ECN’s legitimacy is under scrutiny because its decisions lack transparency and 
channels of accountability. 
1. Independence and legitimacy 
1.1 Independence 
An experienced commentator has recently noted that there is ‘little controversy about the necessity to 
ensure the independence of competition authorities’ law enforcement activities both from government 
and from private business interests.’6 Why the certainty?  Competition law enforcement can have a 
disparate range of effects. For example: firms facing structural overcapacity may agree to coordinate 
the closure of their plants, which may be seen either as harmful collusion, or as a socially responsible 
way of mitigating the need for industry to adjust to changed economic circumstances; a merger 
between two supermarkets may pose no harm to competition because prices are not expected to rise, 
but it may damage local shops and small farmers. It might then be argued that the diversity of interests 
that a competition authority affects as a result of its decisions makes it necessary that it is able to act 
independently of all those who are potentially affected by its actions.   However, this is a little too 
simplistic, for it will be obvious that the authority will have to make decisions based on how the firms’ 
actions affect the various interests at play and it is tricky to see ex ante how an independent agency 
should be the best placed body to trade off divergent interests. Furthermore, the authority needs 
information on how markets work, which can often only be obtained by the market participants, 
including those whose behaviour is being challenged. In addition, competition enforcement may affect 
employment prospects and so the exercise of such powers may be of concern to government.  Given 
the vast range of interest groups affected, and the economic significance of market regulation, the 
independence of competition authorities is not self-evident. 
To begin with, rather than speaking of independence (from government, or from business or consumer 
interests), we are better off speaking of an authority’s appropriate degree of dependence. The authority 
cannot do whatever it wishes, but must of necessity be constrained in some ways by the markets (e.g. 
the authority cannot overhaul the way markets work);7 and by the state (who provides the authority 
with its mandate and budget). It follows that when certain authors speak of agency independence, they 
mean operational independence: government gives a competition agency a mission, and the agency 
implements this mission in each instance independent of government and industry. This also explains 
why some support a narrow mission for independent agencies: they should not be put in a position to 
                                                     
6 F. Jenny ‘Competition Authorities: Independence and Advocacy’ in I. Lianos and D.D. Sokol The Global Limits of 
Competition Law (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2012) p.166. This view is shared by many, suffice it to refer to A. 
Mateus ‘Why Should National Competition Authorities be Independent and How Should they Be Accountable?’ (2007) 
3(1) European Competition Journal 17. 
7 However in some cases it tries to do so. See G. Monti ‘Restraints on Selective Distribution Systems’ (2013) 36(4) World 
Competition 489. 
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make ‘political’ decisions.8 However, it is also plausible to suggest that if the mission for the authority 
is wide-ranging we might expect the agency to be more closely monitored by the government.9 For 
example, if the agency is told to remove restrictions to consumer welfare, one may legitimately 
insulate the agency from state control and expect it to base its rulings on this narrow ground, ignoring 
other consequences; conversely if the agency is instructed to look after ‘the well-being of the 
European Union’10 then it may be legitimate to expect more government oversight in the decision-
making process because of the range of interests that need to be balanced in determining what conduct 
to permit and what conduct to forbid.  
One justification for a competition authority’s independence is its comparative advantage. For 
example, John Vickers has suggested that since competition authorities have a comparative advantage 
in promoting competitive markets, but no comparative advantage in achieving other public policy 
goals, then this makes a case for insulating them from other policy concerns.  The point is justified 
because while a competition authority will act regularly against restrictions of competition, it will only 
act in the pursuit of non-competition interests sporadically, for example few mergers raise issues of 
employment policy. In this view, employment policy is best left to someone who can engage in a more 
systematic appraisal of that other policy concern and who is more likely to be better informed.11  The 
point about informational advantage can be easily remedied by changing the composition of the 
authority, or affording it the power to obtain what information it may consider relevant to assess the 
conduct that is up for review.  The ad hoc nature of non-competition considerations may be true 
generally, but not if the competition authority were to announce, for example, that it will enforce the 
cartel prohibition by taking into consideration the environmental impact of certain agreements.12 This 
policy stance would then serve to stimulate solutions to ameliorate the environment that could 
complement other legislative measures. In other words, if the competition authorities’ choices on non-
competition grounds are well reasoned and consistent with other aspects of government policy, then 
there is no reason to conclude that a competition authority has a comparative advantage in looking 
exclusively at the effects on competition. And if we wish to integrate a wider range of considerations 
in competition decisions, then a closer relationship with the state may be warranted.13 
A more convincing reason for independence has to do with commitment.14 By establishing an 
independent agency the state has made a credible commitment to a particular economic order, and this 
creates stability, facilitating investment, knowing that the state will not meddle. This is particularly 
important if the jurisdiction in question had tolerated anticompetitive practices in the past: creating an 
independent agency is a powerful statement about change in the economic constitution. It is also said 
that this insulation removes lobbying and rent seeking by business and other interests.15 Indeed, it has 
been shown that the single most important feature of a competition system that serves to stimulate 
                                                     
8 In some legal systems this is based upon the principle of legality, by which it is for the legislator to confer tasks to the 
agency and according to some it cannot delegate powers that give too much policy discretion to the agency. S. Lavrijssen 
and A. Ottow ‘The Legality of Independent Regulatory Agencies’ in Besselink, Pennings and Prechal (eds.) The Eclipse 
of the Legality Principle in the European Union (Kluwer Law, 2011) pp. 73-95. 
9 W.E. Kovacic ‘Competition agencies, independence, and the political process’ in J. Drexl, W. Kerber and R. Podszun (eds) 
Competition Policy and the Economic Approach (Edward Elgar, 2011) p. 292. 
10 For this wide characterisation of the role of competition law, see Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige 
AB [2011] ECR I- 527para 22. 
11 J. Vickers ‘Central banks and Competition Authorities: Institutional Comparisons and new Concerns’(BIS Working Papers 
N.331, November 2010) p.16. 
12 This is an approach presently under discussion by the Dutch competition authority. 
13 See for example W.E. Kovacic ‘Competition Agencies, independence, and the political process’ in J. Drexl, W. Kerber and 
R. Podszun (eds) Competition Policy and the Economic Approach (Edward Elgar, 2011) pp.293-295 analysing the role of 
the Federal Trade Commission in this optic. 
14 See generally A. Roberts The Logic of Discipline (Oxford University Press, 2010) ch.6. 
15 Mateus (above n.6) p.21. 
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foreign investment is the perception that the rules are applied by an independent authority in a matter 
which is fair and susceptible to judicial review.16  
In sum, we should start with the view that no agency is completely independent: a degree of 
dependence is inevitable.  The degree of dependence an agency holds is contingent upon a political 
choice. This choice may be motivated by a commitment to a particular economic policy: if a state 
commits to a policy where market actors should be free unless they harm economic welfare then the 
agency will be more independent of the state than if the state commits to a policy where markets are 
regulated taking the public interest into consideration.  Therefore, the position taken by mainstream 
authors that independence is self-explanatory reflects a prior choice to insulate competition agencies 
from political interference through a narrowly defined mandate, which in turn expresses a choice 
about the role of the state in markets; on the contrary, independence it is not a natural state of affairs 
but a means to an end.17 
Having set out the nature of the concept of independence, we now turn to trying to identify what 
factors allow us to find the degree of independence an agency enjoys. As a preliminary point, it is 
important to note that most scholars have measured formal independence, but less work has been 
carried out to measure independence in practice, and as we intimate with some examples below, there 
may well be a dissonance between formal and actual independence. Furthermore, it is well-established 
that some agencies may not appear independent when one considers the statute that establishes them 
but may develop significant degrees of independence over time. The best example is the Antitrust 
Division of the US Department of Justice: it is part of the executive branch and its head may be 
dismissed by the President; however in practice it normally exercises its powers largely independently 
of executive branch to which it belongs. Likewise the German Bundeskartellamt is under the 
supervision of the Minister of Economics but few doubt its independence.18 
There is a broad consensus as to what to look for when identifying the degree of formal independence 
of authorities.19 Rather than elaborating on each factor, we survey them by identifying the nature of 
the threat to independence along with anecdotes to illustrate this threat. 
The first set of criteria pertains to the way in which members of the authority’s board are selected, by 
whom they are chosen, and what their terms of employment are. The risk here is that the government 
of the day selects persons who are likely to toe the government’s line, so some mechanism to 
guarantee an impartial appointment is important. Concomitantly, the terms of appointment should 
insulate the board members from retaliation if they make unpopular choices: their terms should be 
fixed, non-renewable and they may only be removed for clearly specified and serious misconduct. 
Thus when the head of an NCA does not have their term in office renewed because he had rowed with 
the government, in particular as a result of his aggressive policies against former state-owned 
enterprises, then this raises questions irrespective of the formal terms of appointment.20 It is to be 
borne in mind that board members should also be independent of business; in this context we may note 
that when Neelie Kroes was nominated as Commissioner for Competition, the European Parliament 
                                                     
16 M.A. Dutz and M. Vagliasindi ‘Competition Policy Implementation in Transition Economies: An Empirical Assessment’ 
(2000) 44 European Economic Review 762. 
17 Similarly, S. Wilks and I. Bartle ‘The Unanticipated Consequences of Creating Independent Competition Agencies’(2002) 
25 Western European Politics 148, 152. 
18 Article 51 Act Against Restraints of Competition. The political dimension of the BKA’s powers is explored in R. 
Wesseling The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Law (Hart, 2000) pp.171-173. 
19 Most scholars apply the typology developed by F. Gilardi ‘The Formal Independence of Regulators: A Comparison of 17 
Countries and 7 Sectors’ (2005) 11(4) Swiss Political Science Review 139. 
20 C. Hanretty and C. Koop ‘Shall the law set them free? The formal and actual independence of regulatory agencies’ (2013) 
7(2) Regulation & Governance 195, recounting the non-renewal of the head of the Portuguese NCA.  See also the 
concern expressed over the non-renewal of the Director general of the Office of Fair Trading in 2000: K. Brown K 
‘Keeping Watchdogs on a Short Leash: The Government’s Approach to Competition Has Increased Suspicions That It 
Will Not Tolerate Truly Independent Regulators’ Financial Times (10 March 2000) p.23. 
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noted that her connections to industry were improper; however she was appointed but chose to abstain 
from taking decisions early on in her tenure when firms that she had been involved in were under 
scrutiny.21 
The second criterion is about the budget. First, one can look to where the funding comes from: if the 
state pays for the agency, this creates a clear risk that funding can be used as a means to secure certain 
results from the agency. Bill Kovacic for example tells of a specific episode in the US where the two 
Federal antitrust agencies (the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice) agreed to 
withdraw a policy proposal for the sharing of work between them in view of fears that the government 
would cut funding if this went ahead.22  That said, there are also risks if funding comes from private 
sources. For instance, if funding is based upon merger filings, the money can dry up in a recession, 
and if money comes from cartel fines this creates the risk of adverse selection, whereby the authority 
pursues cases by following the money. Accordingly, no source of funding is immune from risks, but 
an agency can counteract the risks of political meddling by communicating clearly the economic value 
that the agency has as a way of reminding the state of its commitment to competitive markets, and also 
to gain social consensus with respect to its activities.23 
The final criterion is the relationship between the authority and the state. This asks how far the choices 
of the authority are reviewed ex ante and ex post either by the executive or by parliament: whether 
individual decisions may be overturned by politicians, or whether the authority has to secure approval 
for its activities.  The risk is more poignant than that pertaining to the composition of the authority 
because here politics can interfere much more directly into the work of the authority.  That said, a 
number of European countries have provisions that allow, in well-defined circumstances, for politics 
to trump the competition analysis. These statutory exclusions may be problematic for the 
independence of the agency only insofar as its powers become so limited that they are not worthwhile: 
however if this is the case then the state’s commitment would also be undermined, so what one 
normally finds are specific statutory exclusions for certain sectors.24  More worrying is if the state 
affects enforcement policy directly by specifying enforcement priorities, or indirectly by setting out 
performance targets which then lead the agency towards a certain modality of enforcement. Some 
commentators take the view that because of the significant powers a competition authority can wield 
against large and politically salient business interests, some political pressure in guiding the agency’s 
powers is inevitable so that the game agencies must play is twofold: regulating markets well and 
negotiating alliances to ensure that its output is supported by politicians.25 A good example of this 
may be seen in the Commission’s fining policy: in the early cases fines were relatively low, not least 
because businesses did not perceive cartels to be harmful, but the fines were then increased gradually 
as the legitimacy of the Commission’s fight against cartels grew.26 Furthermore agencies are now 
                                                     
21 M. Cini ‘Pragmatism Prevails: Barroso’s European Commission’ (2005) Chatham House Briefing Paper EP BP 05/01; M. 
Ruuda ‘Competition Commissioner to hand over five cases’ euobserver.com 25.11.04 
(http://euobserver.com/economic/17843).  
22 Kovacic (above n.13) p.301. 
23 L. Berti and A. Pezzoli Le Stagioni Dell’Antitrust (EGEA 2010) p.69. 
24 For example, M. Libertini ‘I fini sociali come limite eccezionale alla tutela della concorrenza: il caso del “Decreto 
Alitalia”’(2010) Giurisprudenza Costituzionale 474 discussing a specific episode where antitrust law was suspended to 
ensure that a merger in the airline markets was authorised. Similarly, in the UK a special piece of legislation was passed 
to authorise bank mergers in the name of financial stability, see The Enterprise Act 2002 (Specification of Additional 
Section 58 Consideration) Order 2008 (SI 2008/2645). 
25 See generally, F. Rourke Bureaucratic Power in National Politics 2nd ed (Boston, Little Brown, 1972). 
26 On the Commission’s cartel policy generally, see C. Harding and J. Joshua Regulating Cartels in Europe 2nd ed (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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eager to point to the beneficial effects of their cartel policies as a way of legitimising the penalties they 
impose and their regulatory activity.27 
As intimated above, the risks to agency independence ultimately affect the basis upon which the state 
made a commitment to competitive markets, so it is in the interest of the state not to tinker too much 
with the agency’s choices.  Conversely, agency members know that retaining their current degree of 
independence, or securing more of it, may require that they tread delicately when matters are 
politically sensitive. As a British regulator has put it, ‘if a regulator expects to be politically 
independent, then he had better adopt some of the habits of politicians.’28 This conclusion is not to 
suggest despair about imperfect independence; rather it is to capture the political reality where 
competition policy choices are made, and this is obviously a greater concern in countries where the 
culture of competition was a latecomer.29 
1.2 Legitimacy 
A common way of classifying criteria by which to measure legitimacy is to distinguish inputs and 
outputs: we can judge the procedures by which decisions are taken and reviewed, or the outcomes 
caused by the intervention of a competition authority. One aspect of legitimacy is accountability and 
several have taken the view that there is an ‘inherent tension’ between independence and 
accountability.30 However, accountability also serves to strengthen independence in the long run: if 
the public are informed and satisfied about the performance of the agency, then its role is legitimised 
and it has more capacity to operate, and if the authority’s decisions are informed by views of 
stakeholders (e.g. consumers and market actors) then the competition authority gains legitimacy, even 
if its autonomy is thereby reduced somewhat.31 
When considering input legitimacy, one criterion is that the agency acts in a manner that is 
procedurally proper. In this context, three issues have been the subject of debate in the EU.  The first is 
that because competition authorities have police-like powers to seize documents, to question 
individuals, and to impose large penalties, that these powers must be exercised having regard to the 
rule of law. In this respect, one will find an evolving jurisprudence that clarifies the boundaries of the 
authority’s powers.  The second aspect that has been discussed is whether it is appropriate that the 
authority that carries out the investigation should also be empowered to reach decisions, or whether 
the agency should act as a prosecutor and prove its case in front of a judge.  From a legal perspective, 
the motivation for this discussion is Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.32  From 
an economic perspective the discussion is based upon concerns that the prosecutor/decision maker can 
have a confirmation bias by which once it begins an investigation it will have strong incentives to find 
an infringement.33   The third concern is related to the second: in case that the agency is empowered to 
reach decisions, how satisfactory is the degree of judicial overview? These three debates have featured 
prominently, in particular when assessing the performance of the European Commission as an antitrust 
                                                     
27 For example, in all recent cartel decisions by the Commission, the harm to consumers caused by the cartel and remedied by 
the antitrust intervention is noted, see for example Commissioner Almunia’s statements in Antitrust: Commission fines 
producers of wire harnesses € 141 million in cartel settlement Europe (IP/13/673   10/07/2013 ); in the case of Italy this 
may be seen in the shift towards safeguarding the consumer interest by prioritising certain cases, see L. Berti and A. 
Pezzoli Le Stagioni Dell’Antitrust (EGEA 2010) pp.100-101. 
28 Cited in A. Roberts The Logic of Discipline (Oxford University Press, 2010) p.106. 
29 Berti and Pezzoli (above n.23) considering the development of competition policy in Italy. 
30 W.E. Kovacic ‘Competition Agencies, independence, and the political process’ in J. Drexl, W. Kerber and R. Podszun 
(eds) Competition Policy and the Economic Approach (Edward Elgar, 2011) p.291. 
31 Roberts (above n.28) p.115. 
32 For a good discussion, see R. Nazzini 'Administrative enforcement, judicial review and fundamental rights in EU 
competition law: A comparative contextual-functionalist perspective' (2012) 49(3) Common Market Law Review 971. 
33 D.J. Neven ‘Competition economics and antitrust in Europe’ (2006) 21 (48) Economic Policy 471. 
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authority.34 These debates do not need to be repeated yet again, what is perhaps worthy of comment 
here is that in spite of these concerns, the legitimacy of the Commission as a competition authority 
remains quite high. In part this is explained by the fact that the Commission regularly updates its 
procedures in light of what it perceives as best practices and judgments of the European Courts. 
Turning to output legitimacy, there has been a development in the way in which authorities account 
for their performance.  The conventional way is by issuing a report of their activities, which is 
discussed in Parliament. How these reports could be designed to give the best account of the agency’s 
performance is not at all clear. One approach could be to indicate how many cases have been taken. 
Some studies have used this as a proxy for the quality of an agency’s performance.35 The advantage of 
this approach is that it allows one to compare across jurisdictions, but there are risks in ascribing too 
much significance to numbers: not only are numbers affected by range of factors (e.g. the procedures 
in place (states with more costly procedures may prosecute less frequently), budgets, the state and the 
size of the economy), but it can be perverse to evaluate an agency’s performance simply by the 
numbers of cases it handles because it pushes the agency to conclude as many cases as possible, 
simply to hit a target. Accordingly there is a trend towards trying to measure the impact of competition 
enforcement by looking at the welfare effects of antitrust enforcement.36 Again, here one might 
consider relying on proxies (for example, for cartel cases one could look to the size of the fine: fines 
are calculated using fairly stable criteria based on seriousness and economic impact, thus a larger fine 
suggests greater welfare loss).  Alternatively some agencies have tried more refined approaches, for 
example DG Competition has estimated the consumer benefits of its enforcement, and estimated that 
its 2001 cartel cases led to benefits of €2.8 billion to €4.2 billion, while its merger interventions left to 
benefits between €4 billion and €5.8 billion.37 These measurements capture the direct effects of 
antitrust enforcement, however they do not measure two kinds of indirect effect: first the deterrent 
effect of enforcement (economic theory teaches us that this is a function of the size of the penalty and 
the likelihood of being caught) and second the dynamic efficiency effects of competitive markets, 
which some take to be much greater than the direct effects of antitrust law.38   
One should not assume that competition authorities always report on success: in 2005 DG Competition 
released a study on merger remedies. Remedies are often agreed between the Commission and the 
parties to a merger so that the competition concerns that the Commission identifies are resolved and 
the merger is allowed to go ahead. For example, the parties to the merger agree to divest certain assets. 
The study found that in 24% of the sample the remedy had only been partially effective in removing 
the competition concerns and may even have reduced the competitiveness of the firms that were 
divested, in another 7% of cases the remedy was ineffective, while in 57% the remedy was effective.39 
The result of this study was a strengthening of the Commission’s remedies policy and so this reflexive 
approach may be welcomed;40 on the other hand proving one’s fallibility is also risky because it 
                                                     
34 See generally, I. Van Bael Due Process in EU Competition Proceedings (Kluwer 2011). 
35 See M. Guidi M. Guidi ‘Does Independence Affect Regulatory Performance? The Case of National Competition 
Authorities in the European Union’ EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2011/64. 
36 M. Bergman ‘Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? Or Measuring and Evaluating the Effectiveness of Competition 
Enforcement’ (2008) 156 De Economist 387. 
37 DG COMP Management Plan, 2012. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/.  The method for guessing the 
benefits of cartel investigations is to estimate the extra prices charged by cartels, multiply this by the number of units and 
the number of years the cartel was expected to operate for had the Commission not intervened. Similarly for mergers the 
question asked is what the price increase would have been had the merger been allowed, and how many units would have 
been sold. 
38 G. Nicoletti and S. Scarpetta ‘Product market reforms: macro-linkages and effects on growth’ in A. Mateus (ed) Advances 
in Competition Law and Economics (Kluwer, 2007). 
39 The study was unable to determine the effect in the rest of the sample. DG Comp Merger Remedies Study (2005) available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/remedies_study.pdf.  
40 The review was started in 2007, and the result was the Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council 
Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 and under Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004 [2008] OJ C267/1. 
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damages the reputation of the agency. The importance of this reputation was evidenced starkly by a set 
of appeals against Commission merger decisions in 2002 where the General Court quashed the 
approach taken by the Commission.41 These led to significant changes within DG Competition to 
institute procedures that are designed to ensure that the analysis of mergers is more economically 
robust and can withstand legal challenge.42 The speed with which DG competition responded to these 
two instances where its failures were exposed shows the importance that credibility has in competition 
law enforcement.  
Indeed, in competition law circles, it appears that one of the major sources of legitimacy is the rating 
provided by a private institution and published in the Global Competition Review, notably DG 
Competition ranks among the elite agencies and the UK, French and German NCAs are singled out as 
the other elite agencies in Europe. This status gives the agencies credibility and influence globally, as 
well as vis-à-vis the national political environment.43 This rating process is not quite about testing for 
input legitimacy in the conventional sense (even if most of the questions asked are about the processes 
of the competition authority) nor specifically about outputs either. Nevertheless, prestige matters. 
2. Independence and legitimacy of EU competition enforcers 
2.1 The European Commission 
Having just discussed the values of independence and legitimacy, it may come as a bit of a surprise to 
discover that the EU’s principal competition enforcer is the European Commission. This body has 
been described as a ‘political and administrative hybrid’44  in that its tasks include both the promotion 
of the general interests of the Union (by for example, initiating proposals for legislation) and at the 
same time the oversight of the application of the Treaties and of Union Law.45  And while 
Commissioners are persons ‘whose independence is beyond doubt’ and the Commission as a body 
‘shall be completely independent’ and thus take no instructions from any Government or other entity, 
it is also the case that members of the Commission are proposed by the Member States according to a 
rotation system, the vast majority of Commissioners are senior national politicians, there is an 
informal national quota system for recruitment in the bureaucracy, and ultimately the competences of 
the Commission are delimited by Member States.46 At first blush, the Commission does not appear to 
                                                     
41 Case T-342/99 Airtours Plc v Commission [2002] ECR II-2585; Case T-301/01 Schneider Electric SA v Commission 
[2002] ECR II-4071; Case T-5/02 Tetra Laval v Commission [2002] ECR II-4381. See B. Vesterdorf ‘Standard of Proof 
in Merger Cases: reflections in the Light of Recent Case Law of the Community Courts (2005) 1(1) European 
Competition Journal 3. 
42 For example, the Merger Task Force was disbanded, a new procedure was created whereby a draft decision is tested by a 
devil’s advocate panel of officers that were not involved with the case and test the validity of the economic arguments, 
and a chief economist was appointed, along with a team of economists to boost the authority’s capacity to handle 
complex economic theories. See A. Winkler ‘Some Comments on Procedure and Remedies under EC Merger Control 
Rules: Something Rotten in the Kingdom of EC Merger Control?’ in F. Lévêque, H.A. Shelanski (eds) Merger Remedies 
in American and European Union Competition Law (Edward Elgar, 2003). 
43 A brief summary of the 2013 report of this report is available here: 
http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/gcr_rating13.pdf . See M. Maggetti ‘The Media Accountability of 
Independent Regulatory Agencies’(2012) 4(3) European Political Science Review 385, looking also at media perception, 
and generally on reputation and global governance, see A.M. Slaughter A New World Order (Princeton University Press, 
2004) pp.36-64. 
44 N. Nugent The European Commission (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001) p.326. The best discussion remains that by L. Laudati 
‘The European Commission as a Regulator: The Uncertain Pursuit of the Competitive Market’in G. Majone (ed) 
Regulating Europe (Routledge, 1996). 
45 Article 17(1) and (2) TEU. 
46 Article 17(3) and (5) TEU. See also A. MacMullen ‘European Commissioners 1952-1995: National Routes to a European 
Elite’ in N. Nugent (ed) At the Heart of the Union (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1997); A.A. Ellinas and E. Suleiman 
The European Commission and Bureaucratic Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
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be well suited to decide competition cases on the basis of the orthodox view of independence that we 
sketched above, which explains why since the 1990s, when the enforcement of competition law had 
gained in prominence, it was inevitable that there would be calls for establishing a European cartel 
office.47 These calls have subsided today, but before we explore why this may be so, it is worth 
discussing the practice of competition enforcement by the Commission in closer detail to test its 
independence and legitimacy. 
It should be borne in mind that while decisions in individual cases are voted by the College of 
Commissioners, the bulk of the work is carried out by the Directorate General for Competition 
(hereinafter, DG COMP) and the Competition Commissioner. First, the power to take some decisions 
that precede a final ruling (e.g. to initiate proceedings, to reject complaints, to order the supply of 
certain information from parties being investigated, to issue a statement of objections48) are given to 
the Commissioner for competition, and some are delegated by that person to the Director General.49 
Second, in the vast majority of cases the College defers to the DG COMP’s proposed course of action. 
This is evidenced by the fact that most competition decisions are agreed by written procedure, which 
reduces the scope for discussing the wider policy ramifications of a proposed decision.50 Written 
procedures are said to be for uncontroversial cases where sufficient consensus has been achieved by 
the relevant cabinets beforehand; disagreements require an oral hearing.  Having said that, 
collaboration is expected among Commission departments in the procedure leading up to a decision, 
which is an avenue for reaching agreement on how to handle non-competition considerations 
silently.51  Furthermore, the Commission has also explained that when the oral procedures are used, 
this is an indication that the issue at stake is of ‘economic or political importance.’52 In these cases it is 
inevitable that there will be instances where political considerations are aired expressly and may be 
decisive.53  
However, before the Commission reviews the proposed decision of DG COMP, the work of the 
directorate-general is reasonably well insulated from politics and private interests. In the first instance 
a case arrives at the doors of DG COMP through a variety of sources: notification by the parties 
(merger notifications are compulsory if the merger as an EU dimension, and parties may confess to 
having infringed EU competition law on the basis of the Commission’s leniency policy), complaints 
from third parties, own-initiative investigations, or the result of re-allocation where the case had 
originally begun in an NCA but it is decided that the Commission is the best-placed authority. At this 
first stage there is some risk of lobbying from complainants who may press for their case to be given 
                                                     
47 S. Wilks and L. McGowan ‘Disarming the Commission: The Debate over a European Cartel Office.’ (1995) 32(2)  Journal 
of Common Market Studies 259. 
48 There is a special procedure when it comes to the statement of objection: the President must also agree to it being issued, 
and any other Commissioner concerned about the case may seek a meeting with the President and the Competition 
Commissioner, however it is also said that other services cannot veto the issuance of a statement of objections as this 
would risk the impression that non-competition considerations were taken into account.  DG TREN (dealing with 
transport) however may raise issues of political salience for consideration. Antitrust manual of Procedures - Internal DG 
Competition working documents on procedures for the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (2012) Section 2.2 
49 The legal basis for this is Commission Decision of 24 February 2010 amending its Rules of Procedure [2010] OJ L55/60 
Article 13. A comprehensive list of the acts which the Commissioner for competition has been empowered to adopt, and 
those which have been sub-delegated to the Director general for Competition is found in Antitrust manual of Procedures - 
Internal DG Competition working documents on procedures for the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (2012) 
Sections 2.2 and 2.3.  However, note that the Commissioner may, in consultation with the President, decide that in view 
of the political sensitivity or the importance of the matter, that this is a decision of the College of Commissioners. 
50 Commission Decision of 24 February 2010 amending its Rules of Procedure [2010] OJ L55/60, Article 12 
51 Commission Decision of 24 February 2010 amending its Rules of Procedure [2010] OJ L55/60, Article 23 
52 Antitrust manual of Procedures - Internal DG Competition working documents on procedures for the application of 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (2012) Section 2.1, paragraph 19. 
53 For one early example in merger control, see G. Monti EC Competition Law (Cambridge University Press 2007) ch.1 
tracing the political debates over a merger of aircraft manufacturers. 
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priority, as well as from parties notifying their transaction pleading for favourable treatment. Here 
there are some risks of DG COMP being the subject of improper pressure for the following reasons: 
first many cases are settled through mechanisms which leave little scope for judicial review, which 
creates risks of both overly aggressive and insufficiently robust enforcement; second the DG has 
considerable discretion with respect to the choice it makes as to which cases merit investigation. That 
said, it operates with a degree of transparency, for example all commitments proposed by parties are 
market-tested, and this kind of accountability prevents some risks of improper influence.54 
In the second stage, that of investigation and adjudication, the officers of DG COMP remain relatively 
immune from improper interference, and a number of mechanisms are in place to fend off political 
interference: first the Council of Ministers plays a limited role, because the Treaty provisions and the 
Merger Regulation leave the detailed work to DG COMP; second the Commission has published a 
number of soft law notices describing how the Commission carries out its tasks. For present purposes, 
the value of these soft law documents is that they pre-commit DG COMP to a specific mode of 
analysis, departure from which may be challenged in Court. As a result, it is harder for industry or 
national governments to put pressure to deviate from these guidelines. Before a decision is taken the 
draft is circulated via the Advisory Committee, which contains representatives from national 
competition authorities, but it is not a place where local political pressure can be exercised, not least 
because of the deep cooperation networks among the competition authorities which make this an 
epistemic community that is largely in agreement about the best way to enforce competition law.55 
Accordingly it is only when DG COMP’s recommended course of action is discussed by the College 
of Commissioners that politics arrives to affect some decisions. 
Given the above, DG COMP’s legitimacy ‘seems now to be firmly entrenched.’56 This is because it 
has secured significant policy and operational independence from the Commission, which is in turn a 
result of a successful enforcement policy since the mid-1980s. Success brought it legitimacy, which in 
turn made it possible to delegate it more policy independence. Similarly, the Commission as a whole 
has turned more market-friendly over time. Perhaps one telling example of this is the policy on crisis 
cartels. In earlier economic downturns the Commission was sympathetic to the needs for industry to 
restructure and so tolerated cartels among competitors which were designed to reduce over-capacity 
gradually, allowing all firms to survive economically.  In the current crisis, however the Commission 
has taken a much tougher line, rejecting the political case for exemption.57 These developments 
explain why calls for an independent EU-wide cartel agency have subsided: the Commission acts as if 
it was such an agency already.58 
2.2 National Competition Authorities 
Under Regulation 1/2003 Member States have an obligation to designate an authority responsible for 
the application of Articles 101 and 102, and for all Member States this seems to be the same authority 
that applies national competition law.  The design of this authority in the hands of the Member States, 
                                                     
54 Commitments are based on Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003. For discussion, see F. Wagner von Papp ‘Best and Even Better 
Practices in the European Commitment Procedure after Alrosa: The Dangers of Abandoning the ‘Struggle for 
Competition Law’  (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 929. 
55 This has been noted by a number of scholars, see S. Wilks ‘Agency Escape: Decentralization or Dominance of the 
European Commission in the Modernization of Competition Policy?’ (2005) 18(3) Governance 431. 
56 M. Cini ‘Administrative Culture in the European Commission: the Cases of Competition and Environment’ in N. Nugent 
(ed) At the Heart of the Union (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1997), p.84 
57 This is particularly evident in the amicus curia brief sent to the Irish courts in the Beef Industry Development Society case 
(http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/amicus_curiae_2010_bids_en.pdf). As a result of this opinion, the parties withdrew 
their request for exemption of a crisis cartel. 
58 Obviously as noted above, some continue to press for more procedural reforms, see for example I. Forrester ‘Due process 
in EC competition cases: A distinguished institution with flawed procedures’ (2009) European Law Review 817. 
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the sole requirement stipulated by EU Law is that the national competition authorities are able to 
ensure effective compliance with the obligations of Regulation 1/2003.59  Nothing is said about 
independence.  This is unusual given that in the regulatory frameworks for electronic communications 
and energy considerable legislative efforts were expended to ensure the independence of regulatory 
authorities.  Initially, independence was from market participants, in this context the ECJ identified a 
principle of equality of opportunity among competitors and concluded that this would not be satisfied 
if a market player was also in charge of regulating markets.60 Subsequently the current versions of the 
directive empowering national regulatory authorities in electronic communications also provide that 
regulators should have political independence.61 
In the absence of specific guidance the degree of formal independence among the NCAs is quite 
varied. In spite of these variations many competition authorities consider themselves to be 
independent.62 The most comprehensive study to date is that carried out by Mattia Guidi, who has 
quantified the degree of independence of each NCA (at the extremes, the least independent is the 
Estonian NCA, the most independent is Italy’s NCA).63 His findings are fascinating because the 
degree of independence does not seem to be correlated to the degree of market liberalism of the 
economy, although mixed economies are more likely to have more independent authorities than states 
which are either liberal or based on coordination.64 Conversely the longer a Member State has been 
party to the EU the more independent the authority is, although it is not clear why this should be so 
because as we noted the EU has not formally requested the institution of independent authorities.65  
Guidi has also argued that the more independent NCAs are also more active. This is an important 
finding because it justifies the delegation of decision making to the NCA: what we lose in democratic 
control we gain in improved performance.66   
It is beyond the scope of this essay to discuss each NCA in terms of independence and legitimacy. It 
will come as no surprise that most agencies are generally said to be independent but states have 
retained powers to intervene in certain sectors or policy domains where a political decision is 
warranted, and that the resources and outputs of different agencies varies.67 Here we analyse two 
issues, first the additional advocacy function of NCAs, and second degree to which the design of 
NCAs is affected by the European Courts and the Commission. 
While the Commission may occasionally identify regulatory failures at national level (especially 
through the state aid rules), its normal way of proceeding against these is by deploying its antitrust 
powers or its limited legislative powers.  On the other hand, NCAs have varying degrees of power to 
                                                     
59 Regulation 1/2003 [2003] OJ L1/1, Article 35.  This latitude is explained in recital 35 as recognition of the ‘wide variation 
which exists in the public enforcement systems of the Member States’. 
60 Case C-18/88 RTT v GB-INNO-BM [1991] ECR I-5941, para 25. 
61 Directive 2009/140/EC, [2009] OJ L 337/37Article 1(3). 
62 See for example the results of this OECD survey http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/2485827.pdf  
63 M. Guidi ‘Delegation and Varieties of Capitalism: Explaining the Independence of National Competition Agencies in the 
European Union’ (2013) Comparative European Politics (advance on line publication). 
64 The author draws on the tripartite classification in P. Hall and D. Soskice Varieties of Capitalism (Oxford University Press, 
2001). 
65 It does not appear to be a feature of the Europe Agreements either, even if for Member States that joined the EU in 2004 
one finds a pattern of informal convergence to the EU standards, see C.S. Cseres ‘The impact of Regulation 1/2003 in the 
new Member States’ (2010) 6(2) Competition Law Review 145 
66 M. Guidi ‘Does Independence Affect Regulatory Performance? The Case of National Competition Authorities in the 
European Union’ EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2011/64. Although as we noted above, measuring performance by 
counting cases is problematic. 
67 For a comparative analysis of some NCAs, see P-A Buigues and R. Meiklejohn ‘National Competition Authorities in 
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom: Resources, Independence, and Enforcement’ Competition Policy 
International Antitrust Chronicle (April 2013). 
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engage in competition advocacy.68 That is to say, advising government of anticompetitive regulation. 
It is said that in some countries where the switch to competitive markets has been recent an antitrust 
agency might spend 50 per cent of its resources on advocacy, because the major entry barriers are 
caused by regulation rather than private restraints.69 In addition to the powers conferred by national 
legislation, it should be recalled that the Court of Justice has also held that if national legislation 
authorises, facilitates or requires infringements of Articles 101 and 102, then the national court may 
disapply these rules that contribute to a restriction of competition.70 These powers lead us to ask to 
what extent they impact upon our discussion of the NCA’s independence.  On the one hand, it may be 
argued that a structurally independent NCA lacks the requisite information base, or appropriate 
contacts with government so that its views might be heard more effectively if it were less independent; 
on the other hand its independence is vital for a dispassionate appraisal of policy initiatives.71 Thus, 
the effective use of these powers requires the same kind of delicate political judgment noted earlier in 
this essay. 
Turning to the role of the EU in shaping NCAs, the legislator’s silence has not deprived the ECJ from 
having a say in the design and the powers of NCAs. The Court’s most significant intervention to date 
is found in its VEBIC judgment, which has had a direct impact on the design of the Belgian 
competition authority and may well have even wider consequences. The judgment stems from a 
simple case against a price-fixing cartel, but the point of law that was considered went to the heart of 
the way the Belgian law had designed the NCA.72 The Belgian antirust rules were reformed in 2006, 
in part to take into account obligations under Regulation 1/2003 and in part to ensure that the 
procedures complied with fundamental rights obligations.  The legislation established the Belgian 
Competition Council, which is an administrative court.  The Council includes within it the ‘auditoraat’ 
that is in charge of receiving complaints and drafting a report for the Council, who then makes the 
final decision.  In essence, the institutional design separates the prosecutor and adjudicator, a solution 
that ensures compliance with Article 6 ECHR.  Decisions of the Belgian Competition Council may be 
appealed to the Brussels Court of Appeals, but in this appeal the NCA is not entitled to lodge written 
observations before the appellate court. This makes sense because it would be unusual for a lower 
court to make further written observations to the appellate court.  Instead, the Minister responsible for 
the Economy may make a written statement in support of the NCA’s decision, even if this does not 
seem optimal as he will not normally have enough information to comment on this.  The Brussels 
Court of Appeal was unsure whether the absence of a respondent in appeals against an antitrust 
decision of the NCA meant that the national procedures were incompatible with EU Law.  The Court 
of Justice agreed that the Belgian procedures were unsatisfactory: it feared that if the NCA did not 
have an opportunity to defend its decision, then the appellate court ‘might be wholly “captive” to the 
pleas in law and arguments’ of the appellants, and this risk, which was compounded because of the 
complex legal and economic issues at stake in antitrust law, ‘is likely to compromise the exercise of 
the specific obligation on national competition authorities under the regulation to ensure the effective 
application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.’73 
The immediate effect of this case has been to require a redesign of the Belgian legislation, to ensure 
that the competition authority is able to participate in appeal procedures as respondent. The ECJ in fact 
                                                     
68 Perhaps the most powerful are those provided to the Italian NCA. For a discussion see M. Clarich ‘I Poteri di Impugantiva 
dell’AGCM ai Sensi dell Art 21 BIS della L.N. 287/1990’ (2013) Concorrenza e Mercato 865 
69 Jenny (above n.6) p. 167 
70 Case C-198/01 Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi (CIF) v Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato [2003] ECR I-
8055. 
71 OECD ‘Competition Advocacy: Challenges for Developing Countries (undated, available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/prosecutionandlawenforcement/32033710.pdf).  
72 On Guidi’s scale (above n.66) the then Belgian NCA was ranked 15th, and was also in the bottom half in terms of decision 
envisaged. 
73 Case C-439/08 VEBIC [2010] ECR I-12471, para 58 
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suggested that it would be appropriate for the state to designate one body within the NCA that may act 
as respondent, which (at the time of writing) appears to be what is being proposed.  More important, 
however, is the long term effects of the ruling of the ECJ.  As mentioned, the Court ruled that national 
procedures may be incompatible with EU law when they make competition enforcement ineffective.  
What other national procedures might be challenged using this approach?  Potentially the field is quite 
broad, it could range from challenging the funding of the authority (insufficient funds preventing 
effective enforcement), or procedural choices that are made either by the legislator or by the agency 
(e.g. capping penalties, and the design of leniency policies could all hinder the deterrent effect of 
antitrust law and so make enforcement less effective either by over deterring or under deterring). In 
fact recently in Schenker the Court held that a national leniency programme must not ‘undermine the 
requirement of effective and uniform application of Article 101 TFEU’74  It reminded the NCA that 
immunity from fines should only be awarded in exceptional cases, for instance when the cooperation 
is ‘decisive in detecting and actually suppressing the cartel.’75  This is certainly not the last time that 
the Court will pronounce itself on the adequacy of national rules, and some limiting principles will 
need to be found. Presently, the balance between national procedural autonomy and effectiveness 
seems to have swung decisively towards more emphasis on the latter. 
The Commission has also found a mechanism to prod Member States to reform national competition 
law as a result of the economic crisis. Two examples will suffice to illustrate the two legal grounds 
upon which this intervention is justified. A number of Member States have received financial 
assistance from the Commission but these were conditional upon a number of reforms: in identifying 
these, competition law has featured. For example in relation to Ireland, the Commission noted three 
concerns: first that there had been a number of sectors that had not yet been opened to competition; 
second that the judges deciding competition cases brought via the civil law route could not impose 
sanctions, third that because public enforcement is always criminal, the higher standard of proof 
makes enforcement more difficult.76 Ireland duly complied and reformed parts of its competition 
statute.77 The second legal basis for intervention is the European Semester: this is a policy initiative 
whereby the Commission may review the proposed government policies and where Member States 
perceived at risk may be subjected to in depth reviews.  In the case for Spain, the reform of the 
competition authority was seen as an important part of the measures to combat the crisis. The new 
legislation provides that there is a single authority governing competition and the regulation of 
network industries. The Commission reminded the government of the importance that this new 
authority should be ‘effective autonomous and independent’.78 It also expressed certain concerns, in 
terms of financing, the role of ministries in issues pertaining to network industry regulation, and the 
early termination of the mandate of some board members.79 It is even reported that the Commission 
                                                     
74 Case C-681/11 Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde and Bundeskartellanwalt v Schenker & Co. AG and Others, Judgment of 18 
June 2013, para 47 
75 Ibid para 49. 
76 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2011/pdf/ocp76_en.pdf  
77 Competition (Amendment) Act 2012. The new Act increases the penalties for infringers, even if in the past the Irish courts 
had seldom imposed the highest penalties available; it allows the NCA to enter into binding commitment decisions, 
which is significant because in Ireland only the courts may declare acts of undertakings anticompetitive so often the NCA 
does not wish to engage in costly litigation to secure compliance, binding commitments allow the NCA to enforce the 
law more effectively.  However, the new law does not provide for civil penalties, which may undermine the willingness 
of the NCA to act in certain cases where it considers imposing a criminal sanction disproportionate. 
78 http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/idr2013_spain_en.pdf.  
79 Commission Staff Working Document Assessment of the 2013 national reform programme and stability programme for 
Spain SWD(2013) 359 final, pp.30-31 (available at: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/swd2013_spain_en.pdf). 
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threatened infringement proceedings,80 and Spain responded to these concerns by ensuring greater 
independence of the new authority from government. 
These developments, considered cumulatively, undermine the independence in the design and the 
operation of NCAs, in the name of effectiveness of Union Law. To some this might appear an overly 
intrusive stance, but one which is difficult to resist. Perhaps one strong ground for resistance can be 
found by reference to fundamental rights. That is to say, a Member State whose competition laws are 
challenged as ineffective and thus in breach of EU Law may be able to justify this by pleading that its 
rules are designed to respect the fundamental rights of the parties, and so successful enforcement 
needs to be put to one side. 
3. Interdependence 
3.1 Managing multi-level enforcement 
As indicated above, national and European competition laws had begun to converge in two respects: 
first the substantive rules became aligned, as well as the methods by which competition assessments 
were carried out; secondly both the Commission and NCAs grew in prestige and the role of 
competition enforcement increased since the 1990s. It should be borne in mind that this was so for the 
application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU only. A different story is found in the field of merger 
policy: the Commission has exclusive competence in very large mergers, but the majority of 
transactions are scrutinised at national level. The main reason for this is that Member States wish to 
safeguard the option of taking non-competition factors into account in politically sensitive cases.81    
In the context of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, the Commission considered that the system of 
enforcement could be improved, in the following respects: first the Commission considered that it was 
overburdened by precautionary notifications, which meant it was unable to prioritise its enforcement 
policy; second NCAs were empowered to apply EU competition law, but were unable to apply Article 
101(3) TFEU as a way of exempting agreements, which exacerbated the Commission’s workload and 
made NCAs less effective enforcers of EU competition law. Third, it was not clear which cases were 
best allocated at national level and which at EU level. The General Court established certain criteria 
by which the Commission could determine which cases had a Union-wide interest but this made only a 
marginal impact on the situation.82 Soft law notices that articulated criteria for decentralised 
enforcement did not succeed in achieving a better work balance between the Commission and NCAs.  
The anticipated accession of ten new Member States is said to have made the Commission worried 
about its ability to cope with the concomitant increase in notifications.83 Therefore the Commission 
proposed a major legislative change, which is now found in Regulation 1/2003.84  
                                                     
80 C. Gonzalez-Paramo and S. Salvador ‘The new National Commission on Markets and Competition’ International Law 
Office 20 June 2013, available at: http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g=a3dc4651-069e-
438c-9e78-f44fd0c6a055  
81 However this kind of protectionism may well fall outside the internal market rules. For a brief discussion, see G. Monti EC 
Competition Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007) pp.300-307. 
82 Case T-24/90 Automec v Commission (Automec 2) [1992] ECR II-2223. 
83 I find this line of argument deeply unconvincing: if one looks at the statistics on enforcement it appears that the 
Commission, already from 1999 had begun to become more efficient in managing notifications and at selecting 
enforcement priorities. There was no meaningful change in its enforcement policy from 2004, when Regulation 1 came 
into force.  This means that the reasons for reform lie elsewhere. See G. Monti ‘EU Competition Law from Rome to 
Lisbon – Social Market Economy?’ in C. Heide-Jorgensen, C. Bergqvist, U. Neergard and S.T. Poulsen (eds) Aims and 
Values in Competition Law (DJOF Publishing, 2013) pp.49-51. See also, concurring, W.P.J. Wils ‘The Years of 
Regulation 1/2003 – A retrospective’ (2013) 4(4) Journal of European Competition Law and Practice 1, who in fact notes 
that since 2004 the Commission has not been able to pursue more antitrust enforcement. According to Wilks in the mid-
2000s DG COMP was re-organised so that the rapid response mechanisms developed in the context of mergers were 
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The major changes that are relevant for this discussion are the following: Article 1 abolishes the 
system of notification and exemption, so that parties must assess for themselves whether their 
arrangements comply with competition law. Article 3 requires NCAs to apply EU competition law in 
parallel with national competition law in those cases where the practice in question has an effect on 
trade within the EU, and (for the most part) prohibits the NCA from applying stricter national 
competition law.85 These two moves make NCAs and the Commission equals in certain respects.  
Based on this the Regulation then provides for a mechanism whereby enforcement is coordinated 
when cases arise. This is found in Article 11 and also in a Joint Statement of the Council and the 
Commission on the functioning of the network of competition authorities.86 In brief, NCAs inform 
the Commission (and also each other via the network) of cases that they initiate, which allows for a 
discussion on re-allocation should one of the other authorities be better placed to handle the case in 
question. This allows for each case to be handled only by one authority. Undertakings benefit because 
by and large each NCA will apply the law in a comparable manner, and there should be only one 
decision to worry about.  
3.2 Two Narratives of Regulation 1 
The first narrative is that this Regulation is a success, but there are two lines of argument about why it 
is so. According to the Commission, this is because it serves to decentralise enforcement and thereby 
to strengthen it. At first blush, the success may be seen by numbers: between 1 May 2004 and 31 
December 2012 NCAs reported 1334 investigations and 646 envisaged decisions, while in that period 
the Commission reported 228 investigations and 88 decisions.87 While the Commission’s work rate 
has not increased significantly, NCAs that had tended to apply national competition law, are now 
applying EU law with increased frequency. Let us not misread these numbers: they do not indicate 
more antitrust enforcement (NCAs would have earlier applied national law, and recall that for many 
Member States national laws were fairly similar to the EU rules): the numbers only indicate more 
application of EU competition law, but this is only because NCAs have a duty to apply it, when 
applying national law would, in many cases have had probably the same effects.  The other sign of 
success is that cooperation among the authorities has been smooth and fruitful. That is to say, few 
cases have been re-allocated and there has not been any notable legal challenge against the operation 
of the network. Furthermore, relations among competition authorities have remained good.88 
There is however a more cynical response to the success of Regulation 1: it is successful because it 
centralises power in the hands of the Commission, while appearing to decentralise enforcement.89  The 
evidence supporting this story is easy to find.  First large cases (involving three or more Member 
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States) are said to be best handled by the Commission,90 so many NCAs may well end up applying the 
law to national agreements. This is also strengthened by the fact that some NCAs do not make express 
provision for fining undertakings for anticompetitive effects in other Member States, which makes the 
need for Commission enforcement in multi-jurisdictional infringements even more important to ensure 
deterrence.91 Second, the Commission will also take cases that raise new issues and so it has the main 
role in devising policy.92 Third, the envisaged decisions of NCAs are reviewed by the Commission, 
and this has two consequences: the Commission may try and ‘correct’ an NCA’s approach informally, 
and it may even withdraw the case from the NCA at this late stage. This places an NCA under some 
pressure to ensure that it complies with the Commission’s approach.  Unfortunately there is very little 
evidence on which cases are moved to the Commission, so it is difficult to assess the significance of 
this power, but it is reported that informal discussions have led to NCAs changing their approach in 
some cases.93 Furthermore, the ECJ has also played a role in limiting the powers of NCAs.  In Tele 2 
the question arose whether after an investigation on a suspected abuse of dominance the Polish NCA 
was empowered to issue a declaration that in its view there was no infringement of competition law.  
The power to make this kind of decision is not found in Regulation 1, and the ECJ ruled that it could 
not be implied.  This means that only the Commission has the power to make declarations that a 
practice does not infringe competition law.  This kind of decision may be desirable for parties for it 
provides them with legal certainty, also against other NCAs. But the ECJ took precisely the opposite 
view: because the Commission may wish to revisit the behaviour in question, the NCA may not be 
allowed to declare certain conduct compatible with competition law.94  This judgment is further 
evidence that the Commission remains first among equals and is able to dictate policy in this field. 
This is also strengthened by the publication of Notices interpreting almost every substantive aspect of 
EU competition law, which according to one Advocate General bind NCAs insofar as they must give 
reasons for departing from them.95  On this basis, competition enforcement is re-centralised. 
A second, and related, narrative is the extent to which the success of the new system is compatible 
with the rule of law, in particular because much of the cooperation rests upon informal arrangements. 
It is beyond the scope of this essay to review the risks comprehensively.96 We can return to two of the 
issues that we touched on above to offer a glimpse of the kinds of considerations at stake: first may 
one NCA revisit a case after one NCA has analysed it and decided not to move further? And may 
NCAs divide a cartel investigation among each other? Both of these questions raise the issue of ne bis 
in idem, which we find in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Here we have a tension between 
effective enforcement of competition law (which suggests that multiple prosecutions are a good thing) 
and fundamental rights (which protect a party from multiple prosecutions).  The issue has been 
addressed obliquely by the ECJ in Toshiba.97 This concerned a parallel investigation of a cartel by the 
Commission and the Czech NCA. However here the NCA was dealing with conduct that had taken 
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place before the Czech Republic joined the EU and so there was no question of ne bis in idem on the 
facts: the two agencies were not reviewing the same facts. Nonetheless the indication from the 
judgment is that, within the EU, competition authorities may be free to agree to split up the 
investigation of an infringement provided each authority’s action is designed to protect a different 
interest (so for example the French NCA could address the effects of the cartel in France, while the 
German NCA the effects of the same cartel in Germany).98 According to some, this interpretation of 
ne bis in idem fails to protect the essence of the right in question, which is precisely to avoid a 
defendant being embroiled in two legal disputes where the same evidence is reviewed. Similarly with 
the re-prosecution of an infringement it may be argued that the point of the ne bis in idem right is to 
discipline the authority to complete a thorough investigation once, rather than reserving the freedom to 
revisit a suspected infringement multiple times.  Therefore, in this context some of the procedures 
provided for in EU Law might need to be revisited. In particular, the Commission’s Notice on case 
allocation, which foresees the possibility of parallel investigations,99 and the judgment in Tele 2, 
which foresees the possibilities of repeated prosecution may need to be revised if one adheres to the 
policy underpinning the principle of ne bis in idem.100 
It is also worth noting that the ECN as such has no legal personality so determinations by NCAs 
within its ambit cannot be challenged, which leads us to a second general issue, that of accountability. 
If two NCAs decide to split a cartel investigation among them, the undertaking has to challenge both 
NCAs for their action, but it cannot challenge the ECN, which is merely a place where ideas are 
exchanged. This according to some may be problematic: suppose that the ECN discuss a particular 
policy line to be taken in applying Article 102, and then one NCA acts upon this: is it right that only 
the NCA is made accountable and not the Network for designing, or at least contributing to design, 
that policy?101 
3.3 The Transformation of the European Competition Network 
Originally the ECN was only expected to carry out two tasks: to serve as a focal point for the re-
allocation of cases and for sharing information. However, neither of these tasks has taxed the ECN: the 
reports available suggest that few cases have been re-allocated (while on the other hand some NCAs 
have tipped off others about infringements) and the sharing of information regarding specific cases has 
been infrequent. The information that is more usually requested is on how to handle a case, in view of 
legal and economic difficulties. This has led the ECN to engage in two other types of activity: in 
coordinating procedural issues, and in serving as a forum to discuss specific issues. In other words, it 
has become involved in policy-making.   
The most prominent success in this respect is said to be on harmonising leniency programmes.  As is 
well-known, leniency programmes have been very successful mechanisms by which competition 
authorities discover cartels: the fear of another cartel member submitting a leniency application (by 
which it receives immunity from fines and exposes the other cartel members to increasingly high 
fines) can lead to a race to submit leniency applications.  In the EU, a particular problem arises now 
that any NCA or the Commission may take a cartel infringement case, so parties should notify in every 
Member State. To make these multiple notifications easier to manage the ECN members have agreed 
on a Model Leniency Programme, which has now been implemented by almost all NCAs.  On the one 
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hand of course this is a second-best solution: it would have been better to have agreed on a single 
leniency policy for the entire EU, with one notification binding any NCA; however this may have 
required legislative intervention and taken too long to materialise. 
The ECN Model Leniency Programme appears to be, for the most part, a copy of the Commission’s 
leniency policy.102 Accordingly, contrary to those who see the ECN as a potential site for exchanging 
information about best practices, here the Commission’s approach had the upper hand.  This may be in 
part qualified by noting that the ECN Programme allows individual NCAs to offer more generous 
leniency programmes, however these will have to comply with EU Law and must not undermine the 
effectiveness of competition law enforcement.103 Furthermore, the ECN also monitors NCAs and 
checks the extent to which they have complied with the model, and has issued a study on the process 
of convergence among all NCAs, reporting where NCAs have not yet modified their policies to match 
the ECN model.104 There are no sanctioning powers, but reputation and the importance of being 
perceived to be a collaborative member of the club can be sufficiently coercive forces to compel 
harmonisation.105 
So far we have suggested that the ECN, as a policy-making governance network, seems to focus on 
ensuring harmonisation, often using the Commission’s policy as the model towards which to 
converge. On the other hand, there is anecdotal evidence that meetings of the ECN provide both the 
occasion and the springboard for sharing know how about how to handle cases (e.g. on questions of 
how to define a market) and here it is plausible to say that the ECN facilitates experimentation and 
opportunities for mutual learning.106 However this aspect of the ECN’s work is not visible, so it is 
hard to judge how often this takes place and whether on the other hand, some agencies (for instance 
those that are better funded and have high international prestige) take a leadership role in guiding the 
more junior agencies.  Furthermore, it should be noted that one area that has so far remained immune 
from convergence relates to penalties other than fines. Some Member States impose criminal penalties 
for certain competition law infringements, others impose pecuniary sanctions on individuals, or 
disqualify directors.107 Having said that, in the Commission’s assessment of Ireland’s competition 
policy it was noted that criminal enforcement of all cases undermines the effectiveness of the agency 
for it will likely prosecute fewer cases given the higher standards of proof.108 Thus again, 
effectiveness may become the key that transforms national procedures towards a single model. 
It remains to be seen whether in other fields the ECN manages to evolve into a network that 
encourages diverse applications of competition law with a view to reflecting on how to best handle 
certain competition puzzles.109 Should it mature in this way, there would be some tension between this 
kind of experimentalist governance and the hierarchical governance mechanism found in Regulation 
1/2003 and some judgments of the Court. 
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4. Conclusions 
Competition authority design is undergoing major fluxes: in the days of the golden age of competition 
law (1990-2008) governments in the EU amended the rules to foster greater independence, confident 
of their commitment to free markets. The role of policy networks has now strengthened the NCAs so 
that their legitimacy is no longer in question. Therefore, when crisis struck in 2008, agencies were 
unanimous in stating that competition law enforcement was part of the solution to the crisis, and this 
message was not denied by governments. At the same time, the sovereign debt crisis has led many 
Member States to redesign independent authorities, and many NCAs now share their offices with 
national regulatory authorities and consumer protection authorities.110 This may yield a range of 
outcomes: there may be less competition enforcement if the multi-tasking agency prioritises other 
kinds of enforcement tools; conversely there may be more holistic analysis of the issues, for example 
the agency may be better placed to see the implications of its competition decisions on consumers, or 
understand the anti-competitive effects of consumer regulation. It is also possible that the commitment 
to competition by the agencies is reduced when they are forced to consider other policy dimensions in 
their role as utilities regulators. On the other hand, the pull of the ECN as a network of enforcers 
sharing and valuing a regulatory vision may neutralise the effects of these mergers of independent 
regulators. 
Multi-tasking agencies then will face the same challenge of retaining independence and finding 
legitimate space. As argued in this essay, their independence is based on a commitment to market-
based policies by the state setting up the agency and reinforced by transnational networks: globally 
successful agencies are hard to shut down when their effectiveness is praised by authoritative 
outsiders, and when reputation and results are the key benchmarks of success. Only a legitimate 
challenge to today’s market order would call into question the role of independent competition 
authorities today.111 
On the other hand, the principal threat to the independence of National Competition Authorities 
operating in the EU stems from their interdependence. As indicated above the ECJ and the 
Commission have mechanisms to police the application of competition law by NCAs, both in terms of 
institutional design and in discrete cases. This is reinforced by what appears to be the prevailing ethos 
of the ECN: convergence and coherent enforcement.112 Together, these dynamics make it less easy for 
NCAs to experiment. This is a matter of regret because to the extent that NCAs are, in large parts, 
operating credible enforcement policies, it would not hurt to loosen the reins of centralised control and 
opt for a less controlled policy of decentralised enforcement, tolerating divergent outcomes in the 
name of learning what the best approach is. 
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